There are a handful of legal doctrines that can be difficult to comprehend, but the law of the case doctrine shouldn’t be one of them. Yet, time and again, the doctrine seems to perplex litigants, especially when deciding whether it is binding or discretionary, and whether it has any application to a trial court’s own prior rulings. The answers to both of these questions are important to understand before asking a court to revisit a prior ruling.

The basic rule is this: a ruling or holding stated in an appellate court opinion is binding on all inferior courts in all subsequent proceedings related to the same parties in the same action. (Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 491.)

The recent Court of Appeal decision in Roche v. Hyde, Nos. A150459, A1500462 (filed 6/30/20), though unpublished, presents a cautionary tale for lawyers and clients. The case arises out of sale of a winery in Sonoma County by Roche (“Seller”) to Ram’s Gate, LLC (“Buyer”). The focus of the fraud and misrepresentation claims by the Buyer was Seller’s failure to disclose a seismic report that showed an active fault line under a building pad. Seller maintained the report had been delivered to the attorney for a predecessor entity of Buyer (these entities had common ownership and the same attorney, Hyde), in a previous attempt to buy the winery.

After discovering the seismic issues impacting Buyer’s construction plans, Buyer sued for breach of contract, fraud and negligence, alleging the non-disclosure of the seismic fault. After protracted discovery to obtain Buyer’s files and those of its attorney Hyde to prove prior knowledge of the seismic facts, resulting in multiple court orders to produce requested documents, Buyer dismissed its case without prejudice to avoid court ordered discovery sanctions and also agreed to pay Seller’s attorney’s fees and costs.  End of story? 

Amici curiae often walk a tightrope between offering argument that is supplemental, but also sufficiently within the issues framed by the parties. That tightrope may be even narrower after the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S.Ct. 1575 (2020), which vacated an order by the Ninth Circuit for violating the party presentation rule.

Under the “party presentation rule,” federal courts are discouraged from considering legal arguments and issues not raised by the parties. Federal courts “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”  Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).

In Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, the California Supreme Court examined evidence burdens in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute. Despite resolving anti-SLAPP issues, the opinion has serious implications for summary judgment motions that may not be obvious.

In resolving anti-SLAPP issues, Sweetwater analogized to summary judgment motions. In the anti-SLAPP context, once protected activity has been demonstrated, courts are to accept the opposing party’s evidence as true, and see whether the moving party has nonetheless defeated the opposing party’s showing “as a matter of law.” It doesn’t just sound like summary judgment, the Sweetwater Court expressly described the minimal merit prong of an anti-SLAPP motion as a “summary-judgment-like procedure.”

By Josephine Petrick & Breana Burgos

2019 was another active year for federal appellate anti-SLAPP opinions. Most notably, the circuit split deepened over whether state anti-SLAPP laws even apply in federal court.

Despite an earlier trend of federal courts applying state anti-SLAPP laws under Erie, recent decisions may reflect a new trend toward limiting or even eradicating the application of state anti-SLAPP laws in federal court—even in the Ninth Circuit.  Given the current robust circuit split and many intracircuit tensions discussed below, this is an issue that the U.S. Supreme Court or en banc circuit courts may be called on to resolve in the months and years to come.  These developments are a further testament as to why Congress should consider enacting a federal anti-SLAPP law.  Here’s an overview of the current circuit split and recent developments in 2019.

The line between zealous advocacy and ethical conduct can sometimes become blurry to the advocate seeking to vindicate the client’s cause. And this includes appellate advocacy, not just trial work. Fortunately, the Rules of Professional Conduct inform counsel that ethical duties actually demarcate the boundaries that might otherwise be overlooked. And one of those duties is to disclose adverse authority to the courts, not simply to ignore it.

It’s been a little over a year since attorneys practicing in California were introduced to Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.3 “Candor Toward the Tribunal.” In simple terms, the rule requires lawyers to be truthful when addressing a court. But beyond that, subdivision (a)(2) imposes an affirmative duty on lawyers to disclose any law that is “directly adverse” to their client’s position:

There is a common belief among some lawyers that a settlement is not complete until there is a formal written agreement signed by the parties that has all the “bells and whistles” typical of a settlement agreement. Not always so. In J.B.B. Investment  Partners LTD v. Fair (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1, Division 2 of the First Appellate District enforced a settlement based upon emails: one from Plaintiffs’ counsel stating a “last and final offer” setting out the terms; and one from Defendants, albeit somewhat ambiguous but which included the magic words “So I agree.” The Court of Appeal found that the plain outward manifestation of these emails (along with several others subsequently sent by Defendants), reflected that an agreement was reached on the terms set out in Plaintiffs’ counsel’s earlier email; and that the lack of a formal settlement agreement which the parties clearly had intended to sign, did not detract from the enforceability of the settlement. The emails satisfied the need for a “writing” to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. For these reasons, the trial court granted summary adjudication on the breach of contract claim brought by Plaintiffs to enforce the settlement, which was upheld on appeal as there was no material dispute of fact over the settlement terms that had been stated in the email exchange; and the failure of Defendants to sign the formal written version of the settlement, did not render the settlement terms reflected in the underlying emails a nullity. The emails contained sufficient manifestations of the parties’ respective consent to settle on those terms.