California practitioners generally know that they cannot cite or rely upon unpublished or depublished California opinions in California courts, except when relevant to law of the case, res judicata, etc.  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(a).)  Violations of the “no-citation rule” can even be sanctionable. (People v. Williams (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529; Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 885-886.)

Recently, though, there has been an underground debate as to whether the judicial notice statute, Evid. Code, § 452(d)(1), might trump Rule 8.1115. (See Gilbert v. Master Washer & Stamping Co. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 212, 218, fn. 14; Rafi Moghadam, Judge Nullification: A Perception of Unpublished Opinions (2011) 62 Hastings L.J. 1397; Scott Talkov, Citing Unpublished Opinions: The Conflict Between the No-Citation Rule and Judicial Notice, California Litigation Attorney Blog.)

The recent decision of the California Court of Appeal, Second District in  Saheli v. White Memorial Medical Center (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 308, proves again the point that what is stated in your contractual arbitration clause matters. While it may seem axiomatic that words matter, in reality business law scribes generally spend less time on crafting arbitration clauses than the business terms of an agreement.

As the California Supreme Court has recognized, amici curiae can play a “valuable role” in litigation. (Connerly v. State Personnel Board (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1177.) “[B]ecause they are nonparties who often have a different perspective from the principal litigants[,]” their arguments “enrich[ ] the judicial decision-making process.” (Ibid.) Amicus filings are on the rise, and not just in the U.S. Supreme Court. However, with this increased volume has come an increased number of unhelpful and poorly written briefs. Governing court rules reflect this concern. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court advises:

An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.

(S. Ct. Rule 37.1.) Likewise, in California, amicus briefs must “assist the court in deciding the matter.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.200(c)(2) & 8.520(f)(3).) So, the question becomes how, in more practical terms, amici can help shape important decisions, aiding courts, rather than burdening them.

The California Rules of Court allow superior courts to use  a tentative ruling procedure in law and motion matters. (See CRC 3.1308.) Many attorneys assume that they must contest an adverse tentative ruling to preserve their objections for appeal. While there may be good reasons to contest, it is not necessarily mandatory.

It is not “invited error” to submit on a tentative ruling. (Mundy v. Lenc (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1401 (“Mundy”); see Jon B. Eisenberg et al., California Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs ¶ 8:248.12 (“Rutter”).) The doctrine of invited error is based on a principle of estoppel; it “prevents a party from misleading the trial court and then profiting therefrom in the appellate court.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403.) But so long as a litigant asserts an issue in the trial court and does not actively invite error, the issue is preserved for appeal. (Mundy, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1405-1406; Rutter, supra, ¶ 8:248.12.)

In the Roman Republic, the right to appeal (provocatio, as in “provocation”) from a magistrate’s summary use of power was regarded as one of the most important safeguards of liberty. The democratic force of the right to appeal survives today. (See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 18; Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal (2013), 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1219.) Indeed, it is often said that everything may be reviewed on appeal, but as in almost every aspect of law, there is an exception: In California, a trial judge’s refusal to be recused by way of a peremptory challenge is reviewable only by writ. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6.) Here are some practical tips for optimizing the chances of obtaining review.

Winning on appeal can sometimes spawn further litigation, including the launching of a malicious prosecution action. Indeed, if your client has prevailed in defeating a Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) case, been awarded attorney fees because the trial court found that action was brought in bad faith by the former employer, and the trial court’s decision upheld on appeal, malicious prosecution jumps out as the next logical step, right?

Maybe not. According to the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Parrish v. Latham & Watkins, 2017 DJDAR 7724 (8/10/17), it all depends on whether your client (the former employee) brought a motion for summary judgment (or other ruling on the merits but not on technical or procedural grounds) which the former employer defeated on the merits (made a minimal showing of issues of fact requiring trial). In Parrish, a former employer sued former employees for misappropriation of trade secrets under the UTSA. After defeating the employees’ motion for summary judgment on flimsy evidence but albeit arguably meritorious, the employer lost a full evidentiary trial because the employer was shown to have no factual basis for bringing the action and did so for anti-competitive reasons. The former employees obtained substantial attorney’s fees on the grounds of bad faith as defined in the UTSA. Then, of course, they filed a malicious prosecution action against the employer’s lawyers. But that action was dismissed by way of an anti-SLAPP motion.